EXTENDED COLLECTION PERIOD WAS SUSPENDED DURING PRIOR BANKRUPTCY.

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

I

[2] The undisputed facts are set out in In re Klingshirn, 209 B.R. 698, 700 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1997). During 1981 and 1983, as Klingshirn explains, the IRS issued four assessments against the debtor for unpaid taxes totaling more than $50,000. The tax collection statute of limitations then in effect (26 U.S.C. section 6502) provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

     "(a) Where the assessment of any tax imposed by this title has

[4] In 1991 Klingshirn instituted bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 7. Some three years later, on September 14, 1994, he filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13. The United States filed a proof of claim for the assessed taxes in the Chapter 13 case, and Klingshirn instituted an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration that the statute of limitations had run on August 20th, thereby barring the claim. The question presented in this appeal is whether the 1991 bankruptcy operated to extend the collection period further, making the United States' proof of claim timely.

[5] The United States argues that the period was extended by 26 U.S.C. section 6503(h), which provides as follows:

     "The running of the period of limitations provided in section

II

[7] The bankruptcy court took the view that the statute of limitations suspension prescribed by section 6503(h) applies only in cases where the limitations period is "computed by the passage of a defined number of days, months, or years," as it is in section 6502(a)(1). When the parties executed the extension agreements, the bankruptcy court reasoned, they "agreed to redefine their limitation rights from the section 6502(a)(1) 'computational' approach to a section 6502(a)(2) 'deadline' approach." Relying on United States v. Newman, 405 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1968), the bankruptcy court concluded that, "[g]iven the terminating effect of the 'deadline' approach, unless that deadline came during a period when the bankruptcy was pending or on which the bankruptcy had an effect, there is nothing to be suspended."

[8] In reaching this conclusion, the bankruptcy court drew a distinction between a "suspension" and an "extension" of time. A deadline determined by the parties through execution of agreements such as those in question here may be extended, according to the court, but not suspended. The "suspension" language of section 6503(h) thus does not apply, in the bankruptcy court's view, when the parties' agreement refers to a date certain rather than a period of time computed in days, months or years. ¹

[9] The bankruptcy appellate panel declined to adopt the reasoning of Newman. Instead, the panel looked at the plain meaning of section 6503(h):

     "A court must apply a statute in accordance with its plain

[11] Our conclusion finds support in case law of at least two other circuits. See, e.g., Kaggan v. IRS, 57 F.3d 163, 165 (2d Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 71 F.3d 1018 (1995) (language "specifically refers to 'the period specified in section 6502,' and not simply to section 6502(a)(1) to the exclusion of section 6502(a)(2)"); Meridian Wood Prods. Co., Inc. v. United States, 725 F.2d 1183, 1188 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The plain language of section 6503 demonstrates that its suspension provision applies to contractually extended limitations periods").

[12] As a final matter, Klingshirn argues that the district court abused its discretion when, prior to transferring the case to the bankruptcy appellate panel, it vacated an earlier dismissal of the IRS appeal. ² The appeal had been dismissed because of a failure by the IRS to file its brief on time. The court reinstated the appeal on rehearing, reasoning that the question presented in the appeal was substantial, the brief was filed only one day late, the appellee was not prejudiced by the delay, and the appellant had met the procedural requirements for requesting an enlargement of time. There was clearly no abuse of discretion in reinstating the appeal under these circumstances.

[13] AFFIRMED.

¹ Arguably, differences in the terms of the waivers distinguish Newman from the present case. The waivers in Newman created a date certain by providing that the assessment "may be collected . . . by distraint or by a proceeding in court begun on or before December 31, 19__." Newman, 405 F.2d at 190 n.3. The waivers in this case extended the statutory period rather than replacing it with a date certain. Allowing the running of this extended statutory period to be suspended by section 6503(h) is therefore, arguably, consistent with Newman since doing so does not alter a date certain.

² The notice of appeal from the bankruptcy court decision was filed in May of 1996, before the establishment of the Sixth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel. The appeal was originally docketed in the district court for the Northern District of Ohio. Subsequent to the district court's dismissal and reinstatement of the appeal, the bankruptcy appellate panel was created; upon the parties' consent, the case was then transferred to the panel.